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Introduction 
Defined contribution plans are now the nation’s 
primary private retirement income program and 
repository of retirement savings.  About two thirds of 
the assets held in such plans are invested in equities, 
as is the case in the defined benefit plans they largely 
replaced.  Equities can dramatically reduce the cost 
of providing retirement incomes, given their high 
expected returns. But, as illustrated by the recent mar-
ket crash, equities are also risky.1  The resulting losses 
(and gains) in retirement income are also distributed 
very unevenly in the nation’s 401(k)-IRA system.  The 
crash hardly affected the retirement prospects of the 
young: the bulk of the retirement income they will 
draw from 401(k)s and IRAs will come from future 
contributions and future returns.  Those at the cusp 
of retirement, by contrast, are heavily exposed: retire-
ment savings are then at their peak and there is little 
time to adjust work, saving, and retirement plans in 
response to the market crash.
This concentration of risk is highly troubling, 
as the 401(k)-IRA system has become the nation’s 
primary private retirement income program, and has 
led to calls to reform.  The challenge is to capture the 
higher expected returns equities offer in a way that 
provides reasonably secure and reliable incomes in 
retirement.  One approach would make individual 
retirement accounts more secure and reliable through 
the use of mandates, defaults, guarantees, or risk-
sharing arrangements.2  This brief offers a different 
approach, examining the Canada Pension Plan (CPP) 
and how it manages the risk that comes with invest-
ing retirement savings in equities.  
The brief is organized as follows.  The first section 
describes the CPP.  The second section examines 
the reaction of the CPP to the recent market crash in 
terms of risk-bearing and investment decisions.  The 
conclusion draws implications for the United States. 
The Canada Pension Plan 
The CPP is a national defined benefit pension 
program covering workers in all Canadian prov-
inces except Québec, which has a similar provincial 
program.  The CPP only covers earnings up to an 
amount roughly equal to 115 percent of national aver-
age earnings.  In exchange for mandatory contribu-
tions of 9.9 percent of covered earnings, split equally 
between employers and employees, the program pays 
By Ashby H.B. Monk and Steven A. Sass*CPP.  As low earners generally receive GIS benefits, 
Canada’s public programs replace a significantly 
higher share of the earnings of low earners than the 
U.S. Social Security program.6
Intergenerational equity – defined as each genera-
tion contributing much the same share of earnings 
while working and receiving benefits that replace 
much the same share of earnings in retirement – is 
an explicit goal of the CPP program.7  Given rapid 
aging over the next several decades, this notion of 
intergenerational equity requires the CPP to build up 
a large fund to help pay benefits down the road.  To 
do so effectively and to sustain the program’s ability to 
pay benefits, CPP assets are invested in a diversified 
and actively-managed portfolio of securities, with a 
significant share in equities.  
In the United States, proposals also emerged in 
the 1990s to invest Social Security assets in equities.  
Political concerns, however, torpedoed such propos-
als, even for investing the program’s assets in equities 
using passive index funds.  Similar concerns were 
raised in Canada during the 1997 debates that created 
the current program.  In response, the politicians that 
designed the current program did their best to make 
the CPP a largely autonomous entity with investment 
decisions placed well beyond the reach of any politi-
cian or interest group (see Appendix for details).8
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Figure 1. Comparative Replacement Rates by Earnings Level, Canadian and U.S. Social Security 
Programs
Notes: Hypothetical earnings replacement for retirement at age 65.  Canada: for retirees who earned 45%, 100%, and 160% 
of maximum pensionable earnings (= c.115% of national average earnings); GIS amounts are maximum GIS benefits for 
retirees with no income other than OAS and CPP.  United States: for retirees who earned 45%, 100%, and 160% of national 
average earnings. 
Sources: Service Canada (2009b); U.S. Social Security Administration (2008). 
pensions, for retirement at age 65, roughly equal to 25 
percent of average indexed covered earnings.3  These 
pensions are an important supplement to the govern-
ment’s modest Old Age Security (OAS) demogrant, 
which provides a flat payment roughly equal to 15 
percent of national average earnings to all long-term 
Canadian residents age 65 or over.  Many retirees also 
receive benefits from the government’s means-tested 
Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS) program.  GIS 
guarantees retirees an income, over and above their 
OAS demogrants, roughly equal to 20 percent of na-
tional average earnings, with GIS benefits reduced at 
a rate of $1 for each $2 of income, including income 
from the CPP.  Even a retiree with the maximum CPP 
pension would get a small GIS benefit, if that retiree 
had no other income. 
Figure 1 shows earnings replacement rates in 
three hypothetical cases roughly analogous to the 
“low,” “medium,” and “high” earner replacement 
rates reported in the U.S. Social Security Adminis-
tration Trustees’ Report.4  OAS and CPP combined 
replace a similar share of earnings as the U.S. Social 
Security program for low and average earners, and a 
distinctly smaller share of earnings for high earners.5 
The figure shows the maximum GIS benefit available 
to the low and medium Canadian earner, assuming 
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The Canada Pension Plan’s 
Response to the Crash 
The CPP’s financial plan calls for the accumulation 
of a large pool of assets, expected to total 6.5 times 
annual benefit outlays by 2080.  Investment income 
is then projected to be about 30 percent of benefit 
outlays, with contributions about 15 percent less than 
benefit outlays.  To build a fund that will produce 
enough income to make up the difference between 
contributions and benefits (plus a substantial cushion 
in the event of shortfalls) requires a 4.2 percent real 
return on assets.  Given the stock and bond returns 
the CPP financial program projects, this target rate of 
return implies 50 percent of assets invested in equi-
ties.  As the CPP is currently building up its invest-
ment fund and does not need investment income to 
meet benefit obligations, roughly 65 percent of assets 
are currently invested in equities.9
Equity investments entail risk.  Part of this risk is 
addressed by a conserva-
tive funding program 
that targets investment 
income that exceeds 
amounts needed to meet 
benefit obligations and 
results in a rising ratio of assets to annual benefit out-
lays.  The CPP, like other retirement savings vehicles 
invested in equities, nevertheless saw a decline in 
the value of assets in the recent stock market crash.10  
The key issues discussed below are: 1) how such 
losses are borne; and 2) how the crash affects CPP 
investment decisions.  
How Losses are Borne
The CPP is designed to operate as an independent 
financial institution.  Should the Chief Actuary report 
that the minimum contribution needed to sustain the 
program is greater than the current rate, the federal 
and provincial “stewards” could agree to increase con-
tributions and/or reduce benefits to restore balance.  
They can also agree to defer any change in contribu-
tions or benefits until the next triennial review.  If the 
stewards fail to reach such an agreement, the auto-
matic stabilizers take effect:  First, contributions are 
raised, up to 0.2 percent of covered earnings per year, 
to an amount equal to one half the difference between 
the current rate and the minimum rate needed to 
restore sustainability in 75 years.  Second, benefit 
cost-of-living adjustments are eliminated until the 
next triennial review.  If that review again reports a 
shortfall, for whatever reason, the process is repeated.  
The next triennial evaluation of the financial status 
of CPP, as of year-end 2009, is scheduled to appear 
in 2010.  Many factors, such as changes in projected 
longevity, immigration, birth rates, and the like, will 
affect the evaluation in addition to the performance of 
CPP investments.  However, should the only change 
be a 50-percent decline in the value of equities held by 
the CPP, the minimum contribution needed to keep 
the program sustainable would rise by 0.3 percent of 
covered earnings.11  The current minimum rate, set 
at the last triennial evaluation, is about 9.8 percent of 
covered earnings.  A 0.3 percentage point rise would 
thus push the minimum rate to 10.1 percent, 0.2 per-
centage points above the CPP’s current 9.9 percent 
rate.
The CPP’s federal and provincial stewards could 
respond to this shortfall in different ways.  They 
could cut benefits or raise contributions, introduce 
the adjustments immediately or over time, or target 
certain participants for benefit cuts or tax increases.  
Politicians, however, are quite averse to raising con-
tributions or cutting 
benefits just to keep 
social insurance pro-
grams sustainable over 
the long term.  That is 
why the CPP program 
includes the automatic stabilizers described above.  
Should the stewards fail to act and the automatic sta-
bilizers go into effect, the contribution rate would rise 
by 0.1 percentage points – half the difference between 
the current and new minimum rates, to 10.0 percent 
– and cost-of-living adjustments would be eliminated 
until the next triennial review.  As the Chief Actuary 
estimates the effect of the benefit freeze as equivalent 
to a 0.15 increase in the contribution rate, the two 
adjustments would restore sustainability.12
The automatic stabilizers concentrate much of the 
burden on current retirees.  The benefit freeze not 
only has a greater effect on CPP finances than the in-
creased contributions, it also affects far fewer people.  
Eliminating cost-of-living adjustments would reduce 
the benefits of current retirees an estimated 7 percent 
over the remainder of their retirement years.13
A 7 percent cut in CPP benefits is not a 7 percent 
cut in retirement incomes.  OAS benefits and other 
sources of income are unaffected.  Means-tested GIS 
benefits actually offset up to half the CPP reductions; 
a portion of the burden the automatic stabilizers 
assign to current retirees is thereby transferred to fed-
eral government taxpayers, to be paid off immediately 
or added to the national debt.  
Pooling equity risk dampens the 
effects of a market crash.Figure 2 shows the net effect of the benefit freeze 
on the retirement incomes of the three hypotheti-
cal retirees in Figure 1.  In this example, the low and 
medium earners have no income other than OAS, 
CPP, and GIS; the high earner has just enough other 
income to be ineligible for GIS benefits even after 
the benefit freeze.  As other income dilutes the effect 
of the reduction in CPP benefits, these examples 
represent upper bounds on the effect on retirement 
incomes.  These upper-bound reductions, barely vis-
ible, are 1 percent for the low earner; 2 percent for the 
medium earner, and 3 percent for the high earner.14  
While significantly less than the reduction in CPP 
benefits alone, these reductions in retiree incomes are 
dramatically greater than the loss in worker incomes 
resulting from a rise in CPP contributions equal to 
0.1 percent of covered earnings.
50 percent.  If the retirement savings that provided 15 
percent of CPP benefits were instead held in individ-
ual accounts, retirees would only suffer a comparable 
loss had they invested the entire account in equities 
and had the stock market crashed as it did last year.
As noted above, these automatic adjustments 
were not designed to go into effect but to pressure the 
stewards to act.  Concentrating the burden on cur-
rent retirees is clearly at odds with general notions of 
social insurance objectives.  The distribution of losses 
is also quite unfair: workers who will retire soon will 
pay the modestly higher contributions and then retire 
on unreduced benefits; workers just a few years older 
will have their CPP benefits substantially reduced.  A 
small reduction in all benefits paid out over the next 
76 years, a reduction akin to the increase in contri-
butions, would be far more consistent with social 
insurance objectives.  The drafters of the 1997 legisla-
tion, however, designed the automatic stabilizers as a 
political device: they expected the threat of a benefit 
freeze would mobilize retirees to “put a cannon” at 
the head of the stewards to restore the program in 
some other way.15
How the Market Crash Affects 
Investment Decisions
Many financial market participants reduce their 
tolerance for risk in response to a market downturn.  
While this limits further losses, it locks in losses 
already incurred.16  Market downturns also typically 
result in a re-pricing of risk.  This increased risk aver-
sion and re-pricing of risk raise the expected returns 
of risky vis-à-vis less risky assets.  
It could well be the case that many CPP partici-
pants are less willing to hold equities and other risky 
assets in response to the market crash.  The CPP’s 
capacity for inter-temporal risk-sharing, however, 
dramatically attenuates the risk exposure of any 
particular participant (assuming retirees are not 
at risk of a benefit freeze).  The CPP could thus be 
far more willing to bear risk than almost any other 
participant in the post-crash financial market.  Given 
the significantly higher expected returns on risky 
assets, the CPP could then be expected to increase 
its investment in risky assets while other investors – 
most significantly many U.S. households at the cusp 
of retirement dependent on 401(k)s – can be expected 
to increase their investment in low-risk assets with 
diminished expected returns.  
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Figure 2. Effect of a CPP Benefit Freeze on the 
Retirement Income of a Hypothetical Low, 
Medium, and High Earner
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Using a three-year benefit freeze to counteract 
adverse financial shocks also undermines the attrac-
tiveness of the CPP as a vehicle for investing retire-
ment savings in equities.  CPP benefits are primarily 
financed by current worker contributions, not the 
retirement savings held by the CPP.  Even in the 
out-years, CPP assets will finance only 15 percent of 
CPP benefits.  Thus the 7 percent reduction in CPP 
benefits resulting from a benefit freeze cuts the in-
come provided by the CPP’s funding program nearly Issue in Brief 5
Conversations with officials at the Canada Pension 
Plan Investment Board (CPPIB), the independent 
investment organization that manages CPP assets, 
confirm that they view their risk-bearing capacity as 
essentially unchanged.  The CPPIB uses a risk budget 
to control the fund’s overall risk exposure and the 
market crash initially had no effect on the risk budget.   
The availability of “bargains” in the financial market-
place – much larger expected future cash-flows at a 
given price and risk exposure – has actually induced 
the CPPIB to expand the amount of risk in the CPP 
portfolio.  The bargains are especially good in less 
liquid long-term investments, as are the prices the  
CPPIB can get selling liquid, short-term, low-risk 
assets.  If the expectations of higher returns prove ac-
curate, they will help offset the adverse effects of the 
market crash on the CPP’s financial position.  
The CPPIB’s response to shifts in asset prices re-
sulting from the market crash has another beneficial 
effect, albeit unintended.  Its purchase of long-term 
illiquid assets expands demand in areas of the finan-
cial marketplace where demand is unusually weak; its 
sale of liquid, low-risk assets likewise expands supply 
where demand is unusually strong.  The CPPIB, act-
ing on behalf of a multi-generational financial institu-
tion, thus helps stabilize the financial markets.
Conclusion
Retirement savings must be invested in equities to 
keep down the cost of retirement.  Holding equities 
in 401(k)s and IRAs, however, fully exposes individual 
households to the risk of sudden market downturns.  
Millions of Americans now approaching or in retire-
ment and dependent on such accounts must now deal 
with such a collapse.  Those who retain their equity 
investments risk further losses.  Those who sell 
lock in their losses and a much diminished income 
in retirement.  Given the likelihood of such sudden 
downturns in equity markets, the nation needs a far 
more secure and reliable second tier.  
The “stress test” provided by the recent market 
crash has highlighted key advantages of a CPP-type 
institution.  The CPP invests in equities to reduce the 
cost of retirement.  The program’s existing automatic 
stabilizers concentrate risk on current retirees.  But 
the CPP, as a multi-generational institution with 
mandatory participation, could easily pool the risk 
in equity investments far more broadly and dramati-
cally dampen the effects financial shocks have on 
individual households.  This capability stands in stark 
contrast to the concentrated effect of financial shocks 
on households approaching or entering retirement 
dependent on 401(k)s or IRAs.  The CPPIB, as per-
haps the longest term investor in the marketplace, is 
also using the downturn as an opportunity to pur-
chase assets offering unusually high expected returns 
at given risk exposures.  In addition to benefiting 
the retirement savings program, this response helps 
stabilize financial markets.  
The Canada Pension Plan is a national pension 
program that was established by the government but 
operates as an independent financial institution.  The 
CPP relies on mandatory participation and contribu-
tions and on its federal and provincial government 
stewards to maintain long-term sustainability.  Its 
obligations, however, are not government obligations 
and its assets are not government assets.  Its gover-
nance system keeps investment decisions beyond 
the reach of any politician.  The program’s primary 
reliance on the political process to assure long-term 
sustainability could be largely replaced by automatic 
stabilizers designed to optimize social insurance 
objectives.  Given its clear financial advantages and 
innovative institutional framework, the CPP design 
merits serious consideration as the United States 
rebuilds its retirement income system.  APPENDIXIssue in Brief 7
Appendix
The CPP’s governance system is widely viewed as 
successful in meeting its objective of ensuring the 
independence of the CPP and CPPIB from political 
influence.17  The CPP governance system has the fol-
lowing features: 
While the federal and provincial governments cre- 1. 
ated the CPP and remain its “stewards,” the assets 
and liabilities of the CPP are not considered gov-
ernment assets or liabilities.  The legal obligation 
to pay benefits does not reside with the federal or 
provincial governments and government budgets 
are in no way affected by CPP finances.  
Management of CPP assets is vested in the CPP  2. 
Investment Board (CPPIB), an independent asset 
management organization governed and man-
aged independently of the CPP and at arm’s length 
from the federal and provincial governments.  The 
1997 legislation explicitly rejected all political or 
social investing objectives and defined the wel-
fare of plan participants as the single focus of the 
CPPIB – the same fiduciary standard established 
by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA) for U.S. employer plans.  The legislation 
also created elaborate procedures for selecting 
an independent board, devoid of politicians and 
government employees, and for reporting CPPIB 
activities. 
To assure the program remains sustainable over  3. 
the long term, the 1997 legislation prescribes tri-
ennial evaluations of the CPP’s financial status by 
Canada’s Chief Actuary and a review of the Actu-
ary’s report by the program’s federal and provincial 
government “stewards.”  If the report finds the 
minimum contribution rate needed for long-term 
sustainability is greater than the current legislated 
rate (currently 9.9 percent), the stewards could 
raise contributions and/or cut benefits to bring the 
program back into balance.  As politicians typi-
cally avoid imposing such pain on constituents, 
the 1997 legislation includes automatic stabilizers, 
discussed in this brief, that go into effect should 
the stewards fail to act.  These stabilizers were 
designed as a political device to pressure the politi-
cians to act, not an economic device designed to 
spread the burden of absorbing shortfalls in an ef-
ficient and equitable fashion.  Whether they force 
the stewards to act or go into effect, the stabiliz-
ers nevertheless make the CPP a self-correcting 
institution. 
To protect the program against changes that could  4. 
undermine its long-term viability, the founding 
legislation requires changes to the CPP program – 
including changes to the set-up of the CPPIB and 
its investment mandate, or to CPP benefits and 
contribution rates – be approved by the federal 
government and two-thirds of the provinces repre-
senting two-thirds of the population.  This level of 
exigency is greater than that required to change the 
Canadian constitution. 
In sum, the CPP, while government created, is not 
beholden to government in any way.  In addition, the 
CPPIB functions as a highly professional investment 
manager, independent of political influence.
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Endnotes
1  See Munnell and Muldoon (2008).
2  See Munnell et al. (2009). 
3  To calculate a worker’s benefit, past earnings are 
indexed to national average earnings up to the year 
of retirement and compared to maximum pension-
able earnings over the period, also indexed to national 
average earnings.  The resulting ratio determines the 
worker’s CPP benefit as a proportion of the maximum 
CPP benefit in the worker’s year of retirement.  That 
maximum CPP benefit in any year of retirement is 
25 percent of the average of maximum pensionable 
earnings over the previous five years – an amount 
slightly less than 25 percent of maximum pensionable 
earnings in the year prior to retirement.  In 2009, the 
maximum CPP pension thus is $10,925, 24 percent 
of maximum pensionable earnings in 2008; the aver-
age yearly CPP pension for all retirees was $6,022.  
See Service Canada (2009a).
4  The U.S. replacement rates are for workers earning 
45 percent, 100 percent, and 160 percent of national 
average earnings.  The Canadian replacement rates 
are for workers earning 45 percent, 100 percent, and 
160 percent of the maximum earnings covered by 
the CPP – earnings roughly 15 percent higher than 
national average earnings.  
5  Canadian public programs replace a relatively small 
share of earnings for high earners because 1) the flat 
OAS demogrant replaces a relatively small share of 
their earnings; 2) the CPP program only covers earn-
ings up to an amount roughly equal to 115 percent of 
national average earnings; and 3) most high earners 
have other sources of retirement income that make 
them ineligible for GIS.  For more on the retirement 
income systems of Canada, the United States, and 
other “Anglo-Saxon” nations, see Munnell and Sass 
(2006). 
6  As GIS benefits and eligibility thresholds are 
indexed to wages, while CPP benefits in payment are 
only indexed to prices, as retirees age more become 
eligible for GIS benefits and their GIS benefits tend 
to rise. 
7  See Gollier (2007) for a very good review of in-
tergenerational risk-sharing and risk-taking within 
pensions.
8  “The main fear was that a federal government 
might try to raid the fund some future time to suit 
its own purposes,” according to Martin (2007).  The 
description of the CPP governance structure that 
appears in the Appendix is largely based on Denison 
(2006) and Little (2008).  
9  Office of the Chief Actuary (2007). 
10  The 2009 Annual Report of the CPPIB, which 
arrived as this brief is released, reports a loss on assets 
of 18.6 percent for the year ending March 31st, 2009. 
11  E-mail exchange with the Chief Actuary via the 
staff of the CPPIB, March 18, 2009.  A 50 percent 
reduction in the value of equities can be expected to 
have a similar effect on CPP finances going forward. 
CPP assets are projected to rise from about 4.5 to 
about 6.5 times annual benefit outlays, which makes 
the program more sensitive to investment perfor-
mance.  The share of assets invested in equities, how-
ever, is projected to fall from 65 percent to 50 percent.  
As a result, the value of equities held by the CPP is 
only projected to rise from 3.0 to 3.25 times annual 
benefit outlays.  As a larger share of participants will 
be retired, as the Baby Boom retires and longevity 
rises, a benefit freeze will offset a larger portion of the 
loss.  
12  E-mail exchange with the Chief Actuary via the 
staff of the CPPIB, February 7, 2009. 
13  The value of benefits net of inflation would fall 7 
percent if prices rise 2.5 percent a year, as projected in 
the Chief Actuary’s estimates.  
14  The stock market crash, of course, will also reduce 
retiree incomes to the extent they draw incomes from 
individual accounts invested in equities.15  Little (2008).  There is also the notion that this dis-
tribution of burden is justified by the fact that current 
retirees contributed a smaller share of covered earn-
ings to the program, over much or all of their working 
lives, than the current 9.9 percent.  This disparity, of 
course, will be increasingly less significant over time. 
 
16  Under plausible assumptions regarding house-
hold risk preferences, a large loss of wealth does not 
raise risk aversion.  In response to a market down-
turn, such households should in fact rebalance in 
favor of equities.  Individuals could nevertheless reas-
sess their willingness to bear risk if the market down-
turn leads them to revise their beliefs regarding the 
distribution of equity returns.  In market downturns, 
non-rational factors also seem to produce “flights to 
quality” and a heightened aversion to risk. 
17  See Sarney and Prenata (2001/2002); Palacios 
(2002); Weaver (2003); and Munnell and Sass 
(2006). 
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